We study a dynamic, decentralized exchange economy with aggregate uncertainty about the relative scarcity of a commodity. We characterize price discovery and show how traders gradually learn about the state of the market through equilibrium actions. Such learning leads to equilibrium outcomes that are approximately competitive when the frictions are small. We derive equilibrium price and trading patterns related to learning, experimentation, and regret.
Introduction
Uncertainty about supply and demand is common, especially in decentralized markets. Labor markets, over-the-counter asset markets, and housing markets are examples where the market conditions may not be fully known to the market participants. This uncertainty has implications for agents'behavior: the agents may spend time experimenting with o¤ers unlikely to be accepted, they may employ strategies to learn from market outcomes, and they may be more accommodating after being in the market for a longer time without trading. These patterns of experimentation, learning, and accommodation over time-while common in real-life markets-cannot be captured by search models in which the aggregate supply and demand conditions are known by the agents in the market. We introduce a model in which no individual trader knows the relative scarcity of the good being traded. Our model builds on standard frictional search-and-bargaining models in the tradition of Mortensen (1982) . These models assume that the agents know the market conditions, while we assume that the agents do not. First, we analyze the trade and learning patterns that emerge under market-level uncertainty. Second, we ask whether the traders eventually learn the aggregate characteristics and whether the prices accurately re ‡ect relative scarcity when the frictions are small.
By studying those questions, we contribute to equilibrium search theory, a branch of the literature in which both sides of the market make strategic decisions. First, we construct a "full-trade" equilibrium. The identi…ed equilibrium allows for a detailed analysis of trading strategies under market uncertainty in our model. We relate these strategies to the wellknown winner's curse and loser's curse that feature prominently in auction theory. Second, we study the conditions under which the equilibrium price re ‡ects market conditions; that is, conditions under which information is aggregated.
The literature on dynamic matching and bargaining games, pioneered by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1987) , addresses the question of how prices are formed in decentralized markets and whether these prices are Walrasian. Existing models, however, assume that market demand and supply are common knowledge among traders. This assumption is restrictive because markets have been advocated over central planning precisely on the grounds of the markets'supposed ability to "discover"the equilibrium prices by eliciting and aggregating information that is dispersed in the economy; see Hayek (1945) .
Beyond the theoretical importance, the question of whether markets aggregate information has implications for policies that are intended to increase the transparency of markets, to remove insider information, or to centralize markets to decrease informational frictions; see, for example, the discussion of benchmarks for increasing transparency in search markets in Du¢ e, Dworczak, and Zhu (2016) . The main policy implication of our work, however, is that decentralized markets may work reasonably well in achieving market clearance even in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, at least for small frictions. This was not immediately evident from existing work on decentralized markets, especially given negative results for related problems in the literature; see below.
As an illustration of the setting we have in mind, consider a bidder on eBay who seeks to purchase a consumer good. eBay is a decentralized market but it still has a well-de…ned trading mechanism that is close to our model. When bidding on a particular item, a bidder shades her bid below her true valuation to account for the expected continuation value (waiting for another auction). Waiting costs give the current seller the market power to increase his reserve prices. Conventional search theory re ‡ects these considerations.
However, there is evidence that is not consistent with buyers knowing aggregate market conditions. Juda and Parkes (2006) study the eBay market for a speci…c Dell monitor. They …nd that " [a] mong the 508 bidders that won exactly one monitor and participated in multiple auctions, 201 (40%) paid more than $10 more than the closing price of another auction in which they bid, paying on average $35 more (standard deviation $21) than the closing price of the cheapest auction in which they bid but did not win" (emphasis theirs). This piece of evidence shows not only that there is considerable price dispersion in that market but also that buyers do not always know the "going price" of the object. In fact, a bidder may later regret not having been more aggressive before. This is re ‡ected in dynamic bid patterns as well: "A simple regression analysis shows that bidders tend to submit maximal bids to an auction that are $1:22 higher after spending twice as much time in the system, as well as bids that are $0:27 higher in each subsequent auction."
These observations are hard to reconcile with models of conventional search theory where buyers fully know market conditions from the outset. 1 However, they are consistent with an environment with aggregate uncertainty where buyers need to learn the market conditions. We develop a model to study markets with aggregate uncertainty. The matching technology and the bargaining protocol are adopted from Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) .
In every period, a continuum of buyers and sellers arrives at the market. All buyers are randomly matched to the sellers, resulting in a random number of buyers who are matched with each seller. Each seller conducts a …rst-price sealed-bid auction with a secret reserve price. 2 Successful buyers and sellers leave the economy, and unsuccessful traders leave the market with some exogenous exit rate; otherwise, they remain in the market to be rematched in the next period. The exit rate acts similar to a discount factor: it makes waiting costly and is interpreted as the "friction" of trade.
The de…ning feature of our model is uncertainty about a binary state of nature (high or low) similarly to Wolinsky (1990) . The realized state is unknown to the traders and does not change over time. The state of nature determines the relative scarcity of the good. The mass of incoming buyers is larger in the high state and smaller in the low state, whereas the mass of incoming sellers is independent of the state of nature. The larger the mass of entering buyers relative to the mass of entering sellers, the scarcer the good. Every trader receives a noisy signal about the state of the world upon arrival. Moreover, at the end of the period, those who did not trade obtain additional information regarding the state because they draw an inference from the fact that their respective bids or reserve price lost. Feedback is otherwise minimal: traders do not observe the reserve price or bids after the auction. We concentrate on steady-state equilibria that are monotone in the beliefs of the agents: a buyer who attaches a higher probability to the high state bids more, and a seller who attaches a 1 In fact, based on insights from conventional search theory, Juda and Parkes (2006) conclude that these observations suggest that buyers make mistakes. 2 The auction protocol captures that there often is some degree of direct competition and helps with the analysis; see Section 4.4. higher probability to the high state sets a higher reserve price.
We show that the buyers shade their bids to account for the opportunity cost of foregone continuation payo¤s. Moreover, although the consumption value of the good is known, the fact that continuation payo¤s depend on the unknown common state of nature makes the buyers' preferences interdependent and introduces an endogenous common value element.
The resulting winner's curse leads to further bid shading: winning an auction implies that, on average, fewer bidders participate and that the participating bidders are more optimistic about their continuation payo¤. 3 Therefore, the winner's curse implies a lower value for winning the good than was expected before winning. O¤setting the winner's curse is the loser's curse. The role of the loser's curse for information aggregation in large double auctions was identi…ed by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) . In our model, losing an auction implies that, on average, more bidders participate and that the participating bidders are more pessimistic about their continuation payo¤s. The loser's curse implies that bidders become more pessimistic and raise their bids after repeated losses over time. 4 The behavior of the sellers is quite di¤erent: after a seller has not been able to transact for a short period of time, he lowers his reserve price, believing that the state is most likely to be low. The reason for the quick concession is that the pivotal conditioning event (when calculating the winner's curse e¤ect) is the event when the largest bid is equal to a certain reserve price. Conditioning on this event tends to decrease the probability of the high state.
An interesting illustration of this observation comes when we identify full-trade equilibria where the sellers accept all equilibrium bids.
We are particularly interested in the equilibrium outcomes when the exogenous exit rate is small, which is interpreted as the frictionless limit of the decentralized market. We show that the limit outcome approximates the Walrasian outcome relative to the realized aggregate state of the market in many ways but not fully. First, we show that the equilibrium trading probabilities are competitive in the limit; that is, the short side of the market trades almost surely in the limit. Moreover, if the realized state is such that the mass of incoming buyers exceeds the mass of incoming sellers, the resulting limit price at which trade takes place is equal to the buyers'willingness to pay; that is, the price is competitive in the limit. However, if in the low state the mass of incoming buyers is smaller than the mass of incoming sellers and vice versa in the high state, then the equilibrium price may be higher than the seller's costs in the low state; that is, there are equilibria with noncompetitive limits.
We introduce an intuitive re…nement, the re…nement of monotone beliefs in Section 6. This re…nement requires o¤-equilibrium beliefs to satisfy that a higher winning bid indicates that the state of the world is high with a larger probability. Under this re…nement, we show that the equilibrium price is competitive in the limit even if sellers outnumber buyers.
In Section 2, we discuss our contribution to the literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model. In Section 4, we introduce a class of full-trade equilibria. We show that such equilibria exist and use these equilibria to discuss and illustrate our main points. In Section 5, we characterize all equilibria for small frictions. In Section 6, we introduce the re…nement of monotone beliefs and show that, with this re…nement, all equilibria become competitive for small frictions. In Section 7, we provide a discussion of our other assumptions, applications, and policy implications. The Appendix contains the proofs of the characterization results from Sections 5 and 6. A supplementary online Appendix contains the proofs of all results about full-trade equilibria from Section 4.
Contribution to the Literature
We contribute to research that studies the foundations for general equilibrium through the analysis of dynamic matching and bargaining games, which was initiated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1987) . 5 A central question is whether a fully speci…ed "decentralized" trading institution leads to outcomes that are competitive when trade frictions are small. Well-known negative results by Diamond (1971) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) have demonstrated that this question is not trivial.
In existing dynamic matching and bargaining models, market demand and supply are known. Thus, each market participant can individually compute the market-clearing price before trading. The absence of aggregate uncertainty is a substantial restriction for at least two reasons. First, assuming that all participants know the aggregate market conditions is unrealistic in many markets. Second, price discovery has been emphasized as an integral function of markets. Our model allows us to investigate whether and under which conditions decentralized markets can serve this function.
There is a related strand of literature on consumer search, some of which considers uncertainty on the buyers'side; see, for example, Benabou and Gertner (1993) , Dana (1994) , and Janssen and Shelegia (2015) . Unlike in our model, in that literature, sellers know the state, and these contributions typically focus on "reserve-price equilibria." 6 In our model, no trader knows the state, we consider the full set of equilibria, and we study information aggregation with small frictions. 5 For recent contributions, see, for example, Shneyerov (2007, 2008) , Shneyerov and Wong (2010) , Kunimoto and Serrano (2004) , Lauermann (2012), and Lauermann (2013) , and the references therein. Most of these contributions study settings with private information. 6 An exception is Janssen, Parakhonyak, and Parakhonyak (2014) .
Our work is also related to work on matching and bargaining with exogenously assumed common values. 7 Particularly prominent contributions are Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001) . 8 These contributions provide negative convergence results and uncover a fundamental problem of information aggregation through search: as frictions vanish, traders can search and experiment at lower costs. This implies that traders increasingly insist on favorable terms, turning the search market into "a vast war of attrition" (Blouin and Serrano (2001, p. 324) ). As a result, non-competitive prices can be sustained in Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001) even when search frictions are small. 9 In our model, the winner's curse implies a similar e¤ect: when the exit rate vanishes, the buyers bid low for an increasingly large number of periods. Nevertheless, this "insistence problem"is overcome by the fact that agents who did not trade become more accommodating in subsequent meetings. Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2014) consider a related search model with common values in which the traded good is divisible and study the long-run outcome for …xed frictions.
They do not study whether outcomes become competitive in the "frictionless" limit, and learning is qualitatively di¤erent with a divisible good.
There is a large body of related work on the foundation for rational expectation equilibrium in centralized institutions. 10 The assumption of a central price formation mechanism distinguishes this literature from dynamic matching and bargaining games in which prices are determined in a decentralized manner through bargaining.
Finally, our work is related to the literature on social learning (Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) ), the recent work on information percolation in networks (Golub and Jackson (2010) ), and information percolation with random matching (Du¢ e and Manso (2007) ). In the latter model, agents who are matched observe each other's information. In our model, learning from other traders is endogenous and depends on the chosen action (bid).
7 Majumdar, Shneyerov, and Xie (2015) is the only other paper that considers a dynamic matching and bargaining game with aggregate uncertainty. However, they assume that traders are subjectively certain about the market conditions. 8 Serrano and Yosha (1993) consider a related problem with one-sided private information, and Gottardi and Serrano (2005) consider a "hybrid" model of decentralized and centralized trading. Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016) study information aggregation if a single, privately informed buyer searches among many sellers.
9 To make their model tractable, Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001) assume that traders choose between only two price o¤ers (bargaining postures). It is an open question whether the trading outcomes in these models are competitive with small frictions if prices can be chosen freely.
1 0 Examples are the work on large double auctions by Reny and Perry (2006) , Cripps and Swinkels (2006) , and Swinkels (1997, 2000) , as well as the work on information aggregation in Cournot models, summarized in Vives (2010) , and in …nancial markets (e.g., Kyle (1989) , Ostrovsky (2012) , and Rostek and Weretka (2012) ).
Model and Equilibrium

Set-Up
There are a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers present in the market. In periods t 2 f:::; 1; 0; 1; :::g, these traders exchange an indivisible, homogeneous good. Each buyer demands one unit, and the buyers have a common valuation v > 0 for the good. Each seller has one unit to trade. The common cost of selling is c, with v > c 0. Trading at price p yields payo¤s v p and p c, respectively. A trader who exits the market without trading has a payo¤ of zero. Buyers and sellers maximize the expected payo¤s.
There are two states of nature, a high state and a low state ! 2 fh;`g. Both states are equally likely. The realized state of nature is …xed throughout and is unknown to the traders, similar to Wolinsky (1990) . For each realization of the state of nature, we consider the corre- 
is strictly increasing. Therefore, the
is strictly increasing in x and, hence, invertible.
We will work directly with the distribution of the induced posteriors to simplify the exposition later. The support of this distribution is
, and its density is denoted g B ( j!). 11
For a buyer, the mere fact of entering the market contains news because the in ‡ow is larger in the high state. This is expressed by the likelihood ratio d h =d`> 1. 12 To avoid 1 1 One can easily verify that the density of posteriors must satisfy =
, and,
. This formula expresses the Bayesian consistency of the distribution of posterior beliefs. Smith and Sorensen (2013) call it the no-introspection property: "If the individual further updates his private belief by asking of its likelihood in the two states of the world, he must learn nothing more." An implication is that G B ( jh) dominates G B ( j`) in the likelihood ratio ordering. We will later use an analogous property for the distribution of beliefs in the entire population, and not just for beliefs of the entering cohort.
1 2 To formally de…ne updating based on entering the market, suppose that there is a potential set of buyers of mass d, with d d(h). In state !, a mass d(!) of the potential buyers actually enters the market. Alternatively, technical di¢ culties, and to simplify exposition, we assume that 13
The sellers'side is analogous. In state !, the induced posteriors of the entering sellers are distributed on the support [ S ; S ] with 0 < S < S < 1, with a c.d.f. G S ( j!) and density
Each period unfolds as follows:
1. Entry occurs (the "in ‡ow"): A mass s of sellers and a mass d ! of buyers enter the market. The buyers and sellers privately observe signals, as previously described.
2. Each buyer in the market (the "stock") is randomly matched with one seller. A seller is matched with a random number of buyers. The probability that a seller is matched with n = 0; 1; 2; ::: buyers is Poisson distributed 14 and is equal to e n =n!, where one can simply interpret d(h)=d(`) as the prior of an entering buyer. For games with population uncertainty and updating about an unknown state of nature, see Myerson (1998 ) and, especially, Milchtaich (2004 . 1 3 Because the belief conditional on entering (but without conditioning on the signal) is equal to
is su¢ ciently close to one for all x 2 [0; 1] (the initial signal is not too precise).
1 4 This distribution is consistent with the idea that there are a large number of buyers who are independently matched with sellers. The resulting distribution of the number of buyers matched with a seller is binomial. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, the binomial distribution is approximated by the Poisson distribution.
On the individual level, the exit rate 1 acts similarly to a discount rate: Not trading today creates a risk of losing all trading opportunities with probability 1 . On the aggregate level, the exit rate ensures that a steady state exists for all strategy pro…les. Traders do not discount future payo¤s beyond the implicit discounting of the exit rate.
We study steady-state equilibria in stationary strategies so that the distributions of the bids and reserve prices depend only on the state and not on time. An immediate consequence is that in any period, the set of optimal actions (bids and reserve prices) depends only on the current belief about the likelihood of being in the high state.
The matching technology and the bargaining protocol are adapted from Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) . In fact, our model is essentially a special case of theirs if the state is known, with the main di¤erence being that they allow for heterogeneous values and costs. 15 We discuss our setup with a known state as a benchmark now, before returning to the detailed description of equilibrium.
Full Information Benchmark
In this case, the state of the market is known, and we can drop the beliefs from the description of the model. The analysis of the steady-state of this case is standard. In particular, let V S and V B denote the steady-state equilibrium payo¤s of the sellers and the buyers, respectively. A standard perfection requirement implies that the sellers'reserve price satis…es
The sellers accept the highest price o¤er if trading at that price yields higher payo¤s than continuing the search and rejects the price o¤er otherwise. By standard arguments, the buyers' equilibrium bidding strategies must be fully mixed without atoms and no gaps on some interval [r; p], where p is determined by the buyers'indi¤erence between the end-points,
where e is the probability that the seller is matched with no buyer. 16 Here, v p is the payo¤ from bidding p as the highest bid in the support is certain to win. The bid r wins only if there is no other bidder, which happens with probability e . The lowest bid in the o¤er distribution must be equal to r exactly because it wins only if there is no other bidder. By using a similar indi¤erence condition for intermediate bids, one can characterize the whole distribution of the bids as a function of V B and V S (determining r). Then, a …xed-point argument implies the existence of an equilibrium and allows to determine V S and V B as well.
This full-information benchmark is essentially identical to Burdett and Judd (1983) , one of the earliest contributions to equilibrium search theory with a non-degenerate distribution of prices. It is a (very) special case of Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) , as mentioned before.
In our model, the heterogeneity of beliefs takes a somewhat similar role as the heterogeneity of preferences in theirs. In particular, this heterogeneity "puri…es" the mixed o¤er strategy.
Steady-State Equilibrium
We now return to our model with d (h) > d (`). A steady-state equilibrium speci…es the strategies and the endogenous stocks (the masses of the buyers and sellers and the distribution of their beliefs). We restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria where the bid is a (weakly) increasing function of the belief of the buyer and the reserve price is (weakly) increasing in the belief of the seller.
Strategies and Stocks.
Formally, the masses of buyers and sellers in the stock are D(!) and S(!). The distributions of beliefs are given by c.d.f.s j ( j!) for j = B; S and ! =`; h. We assume that each function j is absolutely continuous, with a density !;j that is right continuous on [0; 1).
The bidding strategy is a weakly increasing function and maps beliefs from [0; 1] to [c; v] . Moreover, we assume that is strictly increasing on the support of B , so there are no ties. The reserve price strategy is a weakly increasing function and maps beliefs from
Trading Probabilities.
Let
B
(1) denote the …rst order statistic of the buyers'beliefs in any given match. We set B
(1) = 0 if there is no buyer present. Let B (1) (xj!) denote the probability that the highest belief in the auction is below x. The event in which all the buyers have a belief below x includes the event in which there are no buyers present at all. The probability of having no buyer present is B
(1) (0j!) by our assumption that there is no atom in the distribution of beliefs at zero. The Poisson distribution implies B
(1) (0j!) = e (!) , where (!) = D(!)=S(!) as de…ned before. In general, the …rst order statistic of the distribution of beliefs is given by
Here, (!)(1 B (xj!)) is the ratio of the mass of buyers who have a belief above x to the mass of sellers, and e (!)(1 B (xj!)) is the probability that the seller is matched with no buyer who has such a belief.
Given the assumption that the bidding strategies are strictly increasing on the support of B , a bid b wins if (i) there is no bidder in the match with a belief above x = 1 (b) and (ii) the seller sets a reserve price of at most b. 17 So, the probability that a buyer wins with
We also refer to q B as the per-period trading probability. Similarly, let q S (rj!) = 1 B
1 (r) j! denote the probability that a seller trades with reserve price r in state !.
Updating.
We …rst derive the posterior of a buyer upon not trading with bid b. Bayes'rule requires
if the denominator is strictly positive; otherwise, B + is arbitrary. The posterior of a seller who did not trade with reserve price r is
the denominator is always strictly positive.
To discuss marginal incentives, it is useful to de…ne the "tieing posterior". Let b (1) be the highest bid (with b (1) = c if there is no bid) and let S 0 ( ; A) = Pr hjb (1) 2 A; , be the posterior probability of h conditional on the highest bid being in a (measurable) set A. 18 Taking the conditioning event A to be a single bid b, we obtain 
Optimality Conditions.
Let V B ( ) denote the buyers'value function, which satis…es
A bidding strategy is optimal if b = ( ) solves problem (6) for every .
Let V S ( ) denote the sellers'value function, which satis…es
with q S ( ; r) = q S (rjh) + (1 )q S (rj`). A reserve-price strategy is optimal if r = ( ) solves the problem (7) for every .
1 7 Here and in the following, we use the generalized inverse of , given by
, with Pr(
We impose a notion of perfectness on the sellers'equilibrium strategies, and require
Thus, a seller who knows the state accepts prices if and only if accepting the price yields larger payo¤s than continued searching. If satis…es (8), it is said to be undominated. The condition is similar to the perfection requirement (2) in the full-information benchmark.
The main bite of (8) comes in combination with the monotonicity of , namely, for all 2 (0; 1),
In particular, (9) rules out "no-trade" equilibria with (1) = c and (0) = v because
Steady-State Conditions.
The steady-state stock of sellers needs to satisfy
To see why, note that the left side is equal to the mass of sellers in the stock at the beginning of a period who have a type below . The right side is equal to the mass of such sellers at the end of the period, which consists of all those sellers in the in ‡ow with type less than (the …rst term on the right side) plus the mass of sellers who lose, survive, and update to some type less than (the second term). In steady state, the mass at the end of a period must be identical to the mass at the beginning. 19 The analogous steady-state condition for buyers is
Steady-State Equilibrium.
A steady-state equilibrium in undominated, symmetric, monotone strategies with an atomless distribution of types (abbreviated to steady-state equilibrium or just equilibrium)
consists of (i) masses of buyers and sellers, S (!) ; D (!), and distribution functions B ( j!), S ( j!) for ! 2 f`; hg, such that the steady-state conditions (10) and (11) (4), (5); (iii) weakly increasing functions and that are optimal (solve (6) and (7), respectively), with strictly increasing on the support of B , and (iv) is undominated, satisfying (8).
Every equilibrium determines (lifetime) trading probabilities Q j ( j!), expected trading prices P j ( j!), and expected payo¤s EU j ( j!), for j 2 fB; Sg. With this notation,
We will be interested in how equilibrium prices and trading probabilities compare with those predicted by market clearing.
Roadmap.
Section 4 studies a class of equilibria in which sellers accept all equilibrium bids ("fulltrade equilibria"). We show that such equilibria exist, and that, except for the trading price in the low state, the frictionless limit is competitive. Using the explicitly constructed full-trade equilibria, we discuss how learning unfolds. Section 5 then shows that the limit properties of the full-trade equilibria are shared by all steady-state equilibria. Section 6 shows that under a natural re…nement, the limit outcome is fully competitive.
Full-Trade Equilibria
In this Section, we prove the existence of "full-trade" equilibria for large . We start by assuming that sellers are o¤ering a common, exogenously …xed reserve price r 0 and show that there exists a unique "bidding equilibrium"given r 0 for all . Then, we characterize the limit properties of these bidding equilibria for ! 1. Finally, we use these limit properties to argue that for all su¢ ciently large , the constraint on the sellers'behavior does not bind and the bidding equilibria constitute full equilibria of the original game. All proofs related to the full-trade equilibria are in the online Appendix.
Bidding Equilibrium: Construction and Uniqueness
Here, we …x an arbitrary r 0 2 [c; v) and assume that sellers set reserve price r 0 . A steadystate bidding equilibrium given r 0 is a combination of stocks and strategies such that (i) the stocks satisfy the steady-state conditions given the strategies, (ii) the buyers' strategy is optimal, and (iii) the sellers' strategy is ( ) r 0 ; equivalently, we replace the sellers' optimality condition by ( ) r 0 in the original steady-state equilibrium de…nition (and drop undominatedness) .
Proposition 1 For any r 0 2 [c; v), there exists a unique steady-state bidding equilibrium.
The proof is in the online Appendix. Below is a sketch of the arguments.
Decoupling and the Construction of Steady-State Stocks. The buyers bid at least r 0 , and thus, all bids are accepted. Moreover, by assumption, is strictly increasing on the support of B . Therefore, given any stock of buyers and sellers, the winning probabilities of any buyer type is independent of the exact form of . This implies also that the posterior belief conditional on losing with an equilibrium bid is independent of . Together, this allows us to "decouple" the construction of the steady-state stock and .
The construction of the steady-state stock in the online Appendix uses a recursive algorithm on the cohorts of buyers. This algorithm starts with the exogenously given entering cohort and then recursively determines the cohort that remains in the next period. The di¢ culty of the construction is to ensure that updating is well-behaved during the recursion.
Finally, the constructed steady-state stock is shown to be the unique stock that satis…es the steady-state equations.
The Bidding Strategies. Given the unique steady-state stock, we construct the bidding strategies. First, we characterize the bidding equilibrium in a static, reduced-form auction in which we take continuation values as given. Note that the continuation values depend not only on the state but also on the buyers'beliefs, since the beliefs determine the buyers'behavior.
Speci…cally, we suppose that W ( ; y) is the expected continuation payo¤ of a buyer if the probability of the high state is y and the buyer acts according to belief . Then, we show that for any W that satis…es certain regularity conditions, there exists a unique bidding strategy The second step shows that the continuation values are unique. Speci…cally, we show that in every steady-state bidding equilibrium, continuation value functions W have to satisfy certain regularity properties. 20 Then, for any given continuation value function that satis…es these properties, the unique bidding strategy found in Step 1 de…nes a new continuation value if all buyers are bidding according to it. The implied mapping is then shown to be a contraction on the set of "regular" continuation value functions, which establishes both the existence and the uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium.
Note that equilibrium existence is shown through an explicit construction: First, the steady-state stocks are constructed using a recursive algorithm on the cohorts. Second, a contraction mapping determines the continuation values, and, third, the bidding strategy is a solution to a standard di¤erential equation. Thus, in principle, the bidding equilibria can be numerically constructed and evaluated.
Limit Properties of Full-Trade Bidding Equilibria
This section characterizes the outcome of full-trade equilibria for ! 1. Let f k g 1 k=1 be a sequence of such that the exit rate converges to zero, lim k!1 (1 k ) = 0. From Proposition 1, there is a unique bidding equilibrium for each k . Denote the corresponding equilibrium
, and so on. To simplify notation, throughout the paper, the term "limit"(and the operator lim) refers to a limit over a subsequence such that all the magnitudes of interest are converging. 21 We will not repeat this quali…cation each time, but it is always there. Also, since most limits are with respect to k ! 1, we suppress it and write lim (1 k ) = 0 etc.
Proposition 2 Suppose d`< s < d h and take any r 0 2 [c; v). Then, for the unique steadystate bidding equilibria given r 0 ,
Thus, the limit outcome is competitive if r 0 = c: The short side of the market trades with probability converging to one, and the price is v and c in the high and in the low state, respectively. If r 0 > c, then the limit outcome is almost competitive, except that the price is higher than the competitive price when ! =`. In the following, we discuss why the proposition holds. Because this discussion is already an almost complete proof and because the proposition is a special case of subsequent results, we do not provide a separate proof. 22 (i) The short side trades for sure in each state in the limit in any full-trade equilibrium.
Consider ! = h. Since s < d (h), the steady-state conditions imply for any k , it must be the case that S k (h) < D k (h). 23 So, each seller is matched with positive probability with a buyer in every period since
sellers trade with probability converging to one as k ! 1.
, that is, with positive and nonvanishing probability any buyer is the sole bidder. Therefore, as k ! 1, buyers must trade with probability converging to one.
2 1 This will be su¢ cient for our purposes since for the sequences under consideration, any property that holds for all converging subsequences also holds for the original sequence itself. Without this convention, we would need to introduce multiple layers of sub(-sub)sequences throughout many of our proofs.
2 2 To be precise, the following discussion gives a complete proof for why the trading probabilities are competitive. The argument for lim P B k ( j`) = r0 is also essentially complete. The argument for lim P S k ( jh) = v is the only place where the discussion is incomplete. The interested reader will …nd a formalization of the intuition from the text in the proof of Proposition 4 on Page 36 of the Appendix.
2 3 This inequality is formally shown in Equation (29) in the online Appendix. It holds because buyers and sellers either exit in pairs or with the same exogenous exit probability 1 . This inequality is true for any strategy pro…le ( ; ), not just the full-trade pro…le considered here.
2 4 Recall our convention that lim refers to a subsequence for which the limit exists in the extended reals.
(ii) In the limit, almost all trades take place at prices close to r 0 in the low state and close to v in the high state.
Intuitively, bidding in the low state is very non-competitive: Any bid r 0 + " guarantees sure winning in the low state in the limit because with positive probability any buyer is the sole bidder, as observed before. Therefore, buyers trade at a price close to r 0 in the low state.
Conversely, in the high state, it is not feasible for all buyers to trade with probability one since s < d (h). Therefore, some buyers will be rationed and have to stay in the market for many periods as k ! 1. Thus, there are many buyers who are essentially certain that the state is high, and these buyers drive up the price to v. We return to this discussion later in Section 4.5, where we relate the dynamic bidding behavior to the winner's and loser's curse.
For later reference, note that the sellers'trading probability in the low state satis…es
which follows from lim Q B k ( j`) = 1, feasibility, 25 and the sellers'common reserve price.
Full-Trade Equilibria of the Entire Game
We show that when is high, then for any interior r 0 there exists a full-trade equilibrium of the overall game where all the sellers set reserve price r 0 and the buyers bid according to the unique bidding equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 1. 26 Proposition 3 Suppose d`< s < d h . Take any r 0 2 (c; v). If is su¢ ciently large, there exists a steady-state equilibrium of the original game with ( ) r 0 for all 2 (0; 1).
The proof is in the online Appendix. The proof uses the limit properties identi…ed in Proposition 2. We …x some sequence k ! 1 and the corresponding sequence of bidding equilibria k .
Setting r 0 is a Best Response.
First, the proof shows that setting a reserve price above r 0 is not optimal for any seller with any non-degenerate belief, for k close enough to 1. Speci…cally, consider any r 0 2 (r 0 ; v).
Then, it follows from Proposition 2 that the probability of the low state conditional on the highest bid being below r 0 converges to 1 as k ! 1. This is because sellers trade with probability converging to 0 at such prices in the high state but with positive probability in the low state. Now, from Proposition 2 and the subsequent remark, the sellers'continuation payo¤ in state`is roughly
s (r 0 c) < r 0 c. Thus, raising the reserve price from r 0 to any r 0 2 (r 0 ; v) is not optimal for k large enough. The proof in the appendix veri…es that for su¢ ciently large k, there is no pro…table deviation to any r 0 2 (r 0 ; v]. It is clearly not strictly pro…table to set r 0 < r 0 given k (0) r 0 .
The Reserve Price r 0 is "Undominated" Second, the proof shows that the equilibrium satis…es undominatedness. Since ( ) = r 0 for 2 (0; 1) this requires k V S k (0) r 0 c k V S k (1); see (9). Proposition 2 implies that for the constructed equilibria, these inequalities hold for all r 0 2 (c; v) and k large enough.
In particular, we observed in the paragraph above that lim
s (r 0 c), and it is immediate from Proposition 2 that lim V S k (1) = v c.
Remark. Seller Observing Bids before Accepting
The proof of Proposition 3 also implies that if the seller observes the highest bid b before setting a reserve price, then the full-trade equilibrium constructed above would remain an equilibrium for small frictions. For example, we already argued that the seller would accept any bid between r 0 and r 0 < v, for k su¢ ciently large. For bids below r 0 , one can assign o¤-equilibrium beliefs in an appropriate way to rationalize rejection.
Full-Trade Equilibria and Equilibrium Existence
There are a number of technical challenges that any existence proof for a model of search with learning faces. Our model is set up to solve or circumvent these, and the full-trade equilibria are particularly useful in this regard.
First, as is well-known, proving the existence of equilibrium is a non-trivial problem in any search model because of the endogeneity of the distribution of population characteristics;
see Smith (2011) . This problem is magni…ed with learning because the relevant types (beliefs in our model) are evolving according to an endogenous transition rule. The assumption that feedback is minimal helps. Full-trade equilibria help further because we can decouple the determination of the stock and the strategies; see above.
Second, the e¤ective sellers' costs and the buyers' values depend (through endogenous outside options) on a state of the world about which the agents have private information.
In other words, we are solving a bargaining problem with two-sided asymmetric information and interdependent values, for which little progress has been made; see, e.g., Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) . The auction protocol helps because-at least, in the full-trade equilibria-one market side can be taken to be essentially non-strategic. Moreover, the protocol reduces the multiplicity problem that is common in two-sided asymmetric information bargaining problems (although the multiplicity problem is still there).
There are two other technical problems. First, as Reny and Perry (2006) show, the …rst order statistic of a¢ liated random variables that are mapped by two di¤erent monotone functions (reserve prices and bidding strategies) does not have to be a¢ liated in general, which makes it di¢ cult to prove existence of monotone equilibria in general. Here, full-trade equilibria render this problem moot. Second, with a Poisson distributed number of bidderseven if the means are the same-the a¢ liation of the …rst order statistic of the bidders'type with the state is generally lost. We solve this problem by placing a lower bound on the bidders'types in the in ‡ow, which implies that belief updating is monotone upward in any full-trade equilibrium.
Let us note that full-trade equilibria have been studied in the related literature before to address existence problem; see Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) and the consumer search literature discussed in our literature review for examples.
Finally, full-trade equilibria allow for explicit characterization results. For example, we are able to derive the distribution of beliefs explicitly so the model is amenable to numerical analysis. Also, as shown below, in our model most of the important characterization results extend to other types of equilibria; see Section 5.
Price Discovery: Winner' s and Loser Curse
It follows from Propositions 2 and 3 that for close to 1, there exists a full-trade equilibrium in which sellers set a common reserve price close to c and the outcome is close to being competitive. 27 We use these equilibria to show how price discovery takes place through a "decentralized tâtonnement process," by which we mean the dynamic bidding behavior of the individual buyers and sellers.
In the full-trade equilibrium, the buyers and the sellers behave di¤erently: The sellers set the same reserve price r 0 regardless of their time on the market. The buyers, however, increase their bids every time they have not traded. A buyer who has entered the market a long enough time ago bids close to v. This ensures that prices are close to r 0 in the low state and close to v in the high state. Given this, the sellers can "trust the market"to ensure them the right price even when setting a low reserve price. (Indeed, one can observe sellers using "absolute auctions" with no reserve price in many online markets such as eBay; see Jehiel and Lamy (2015) .) Note that the critical piece of information about the correct price comes through the behavior of buyers who increase their bids after having been unable to trade at the low price. This may be compared to the tâtonnement process of a hypothetical
Walrasian auctioneer who increases prices after observing excess demand.
To explain the dynamics of the buyers'bidding strategies and the di¤erence to the sellers' reserve price strategies, we consider two important e¤ects. These two e¤ects are useful for analyzing the buyers' behavior. First, the winner's curse means that a buyer may bid low even if she is almost certain that the state favors the sellers. Second, the loser's curse means that if a buyer has not traded for su¢ ciently many periods, then she eventually increases her bid.
To describe this more formally, we derive the optimality condition that determines the equilibrium bidding strategy . (The following can be skipped by the reader with no loss of continuity.) Recall that EU B ( j!) is the expected payo¤ of a buyer with belief in state !.
If the probability of state h is y, the expected payo¤ of a buyer who holds belief is
The expected distribution of the highest type among the other bidders is
(1) ( j`), where B (1) ( j!) is the probability that the highest (other) type is below in state !. Then, the payo¤ of a buyer who has type but mimics 0 by bidding 0 is
where
is the posterior of a buyer who starts with belief and loses with a bid 0 . Using that in equilibrium choosing 0 = is optimal, and solving the necessary …rst-order condition for to be a best response for given continuation payo¤s W yields the di¤erential equation 28
with initial condition (0) = r 0 and where
is the posterior of a buyer who starts with belief conditional on being tied at bid ( ). The main point is that the buyer's "e¤ective valuation" is v W B + ; B 0 , which takes into account the continuation payo¤. Importantly, the continuation payo¤ is evaluated conditional on being tied because this is the pivotal event for a marginal change in the bid. 29 The winner's curse e¤ect can be formally captured by the observation that even if a bidder is very certain that the state is high ( is close to 1), the bid function may still not respond much ( 0 is close to zero) if, conditional on being the highest type in the auction, the belief B 0 ( ; ( )) remains low. Intuitively, in the pivotal event of tieing at the top, the state can be low with a very high probability even if the prior entering the auction prescribes a very high probability for the high state. This leads to rational bidders depressing their bids even 2 8 See Lemma 17 and its proof in the online Appendix for the derivation of (12). if the bidders attach a very high probability to the high state (and thus a high value of the object). This phenomenon is called the winner's curse in the auction literature.
We also describe the loser's curse in full-trade equilibria. In particular, buyers who have not traded for su¢ ciently many periods know that the state likely favors the sellers-even conditional on being tied at the top-and increase their bids. Formally, the loser's curse can be captured by the observation that buyers update their beliefs upon not trading such that
The winner's curse works di¤erently for the sellers. The pivotal event for a marginal increase in r is that the highest bid is equal to the equilibrium reserve price r 0 . In the fulltrade equilibrium constructed, this pivotal event indicates that the state is likely to be the low state, indicating a low opportunity cost of selling. Therefore, the winner's curse does not arise for the sellers, and the sellers do not have an incentive to increase their reserve prices.
Given that the sellers accept all bids anyway, the scope for the loser's curse is limited as well.
In the equilibrium constructed, the sellers do not decrease their reserve prices over time at all.
Limiting Allocations for All Equilibria
We argued above that for any sequence of full-trade equilibria, the limiting allocation is competitive with one exception: The limiting transaction price may be above the competitive price in the low state when there is uncertainty about the competitive allocation (d`< s < d h ). Here, we show that this characterization extends to all steady-state equilibria. 30
Proposition 4 Take any sequence k ! 1 and consider any corresponding sequence of steady-state equilibria.
B ] and ! =`; h.
The main di¢ culty is showing that trading probabilities become competitive in all steadystate equilibria in the limit. In the full-trade equilibria considered before, this was easily shown to be true. Here, however, we need to rule out "war-of-attrition" type structures.
This problem is self-enforcing: Once buyers are insisting on low prices for su¢ ciently many periods, it is no longer optimal for sellers to "trust the market"and set very low reserve prices.
However, once sellers are insisting on high prices themselves, not trading is less informative for buyers, and so it becomes optimal for buyers to indeed bid low for longer.
Sketch of the Proof
The proposition follows from two lemmas. The lemmas highlight the role of "rationing" in price discovery. First, if a seller who knows that the state is high trades with probability less than one (is rationed), then prices unravel all the way down to c:
The lemma is proven as follows. First, lim Q S k (1jh) < 1 implies that the probability of a bid above k (1) vanishes to zero. Hence, a buyer who bids k (1) + " wins almost surely (for any " > 0 and k large enough), so that the optimal bid satis…es lim k (1)
In words, suppose a seller with type = 1 who is sure of ! = h trades with probability less than one but insists on a relatively high reserve price. Then, the seller's continuation payo¤ is below the payo¤ from trading at the reserve price, leading the seller to accept lower prices as well by undominatedness-which eventually unravels all the way to c.
The idea of the proof is as follows. First, lim D k (`)=S k (`) > 0 means that sellers are matched with at least one buyer with a positive, non-vanishing probability every period. Now, optimal bidding requires that k (0) k (0), since, otherwise, no seller would accept k (0). But for sellers to accept k (0), it must be unlikely that any buyer bids much higher, meaning, almost all buyers are bidding between k (0) and k (0) + ", for any " > 0 and k large enough. 31 So, as k ! 1, there is an atom in the bid distribution at k (0). Finally, if both, lim Q B k (0j`) < 1 and lim k (0) < v, a buyer having type = 0 has a strict incentive to overbid this atom in order to increase her trading probability.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2 to prove Proposition 4.
Since more sellers than buyers enter the market, feasibility dictates that not all sellers can trade with probability one in the limit. In particular, by monotonicity of k , lim Q S k (1jh) < 1. Now, Lemma 1 implies lim k (1) = lim k (1) = c. Therefore, a buyer who bids c + " is certain to trade as k ! 1. So, the buyers'payo¤s are converging to v c-which means they must trade with probability converging to one at a price converging to c, implying the claim.
for all k. Hence, by Lemma 2, either lim Q B k (0j`) = 1 or lim k (0) = v. However, since more buyers than sellers enter the market, feasibility and monotonicity of k require lim Q B k (0j`) < 1. So, lim k (0) = v. But this means all buyers are bidding close to v in the limit and
for all k means that sellers are certain to be matched with some buyer eventually. So, the sellers'payo¤s are converging to v c-which implies the claim.
Finally, suppose d`< s < d h . We start by verifying the trading probabilities and consider
This would mean that all buyers could ensure themselves a payo¤ close to v c by bidding just slightly above c. However, since d h > s, it is not feasible that all buyers have payo¤s v c, since this would require a trading probability of one. Therefore, lim Q S k (1jh) < 1 cannot hold. Now, consider ! =`. If not all buyers are able to trade with probability converging to one, then a positive mass of them accumulates, implying that lim D k (`)=S k (`) > 0. Also, by the monotonicity of k , lim Q B k (0j`) < 1. So, by Lemma 2, lim k (0) = v. But this and lim D k (`)=S k (`) > 0 would allow all sellers to trade with probability converging to one at a price v, so that all sellers could ensure a payo¤ v c in the low state. But this contradicts feasibility since d`< s means that not all sellers can end up trading. Thus, it must be that almost all buyers can trade, as claimed.
Given that the trading probabilities of the shorter side of the market are one, all traders from the shorter side will trade at the same price (to see why, suppose two types of sellers both trade with probability one in the high state but at di¤erent prices; then, the type that trades at the lower price has an incentive to mimic the other). Thus, almost all trade must take place at the same price (the law-of-one-price). Now, to see that this price must be v for ! = h, note that the trading probability of the buyers must be strictly smaller than one since s < d h . But then each buyer would have an incentive to bid higher than the common trading price in order to increase its trading probability-which drives prices up to v.
Relation to Full-Trade Equilibria
The full-trade equilibria also capture another property common to steady-state equilibria:
Suppose that d`< s < d h and consider any sequence of steady-state equilibria that does not converge to the competitive allocation, that is, p`> c. In the online Appendix, Proposition 9 shows the following: There exists a sequence of periods ft k g 1 k=1 with lim( k ) t k = 1, such that all sellers who entered at least t k periods ago set a reserve price r that is almost surely acceptable to any buyer he is matched with. Since lim( k ) t k = 1, the probability of exogenous exit before t k vanishes to zero. Thus, similar to the full-trade equilibria, sellers are conceding quickly to buyers in any non-competitive equilibrium. 32
Competitive Limit with Monotone Beliefs
O¤-Equilibrium Beliefs and Information Aggregation
Proposition 4 shows that steady-state equilibrium outcomes are almost competitive for small frictions, except that prices may be too high in the low state if d`< s < d h -meaning, equilibria are non-competitive exactly when there is aggregate uncertainty about the market clearing price but not otherwise. Proposition 3 shows that non-competitive equilibria indeed exist.
What drives the non-competitive outcome is a combination of the trading protocol and aggregate uncertainty. Most fundamentally, for any r 0 2 (c; v), it is trivially a mutual best response for sellers to set reserve prices not smaller than r 0 and for buyers to bid at least r 0 -since no buyer bids below r 0 , sellers have no incentives to set reserve prices below r 0 and, given that, buyers have no incentives to bid below r 0 .
However, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, this problem can be solved easily. To see this, recall from Proposition 4 that when s > d h > d`-sellers are known to be on the long side-prices are close to c in every undominated equilibrium. In particular, there is no fulltrade equilibrium with sellers setting r 0 > c. This is because, given the corresponding bidding equilibrium from Proposition 1, even the highest continuation payo¤ V S (1) is bounded strictly below r 0 c for ! 1. Therefore, the reserve price r 0 would be weakly dominated by any reserve price r 0 < r 0 for which r 0 > V S (1) + c: Whatever a seller believes about the state, if the winning bid is in [r 0 ; r 0 ], accepting the bid yields strictly higher payo¤s than continuation, and otherwise, if the winning bid is not in [r 0 ; r 0 ], then it does not matter 3 2 When the limit is competitive, p`= c, there may be steady-state equilibria in which the sellers do not concede quickly (relative to k ) in the limit. There is a possibility for an equilibrium in which the sellers set high reserve prices for a very long time, and the buyers bid close to p`= c for a long time as well. In this case, the sellers may not have incentives to accept those low bids because those o¤ers are close to the sellers' outside options, lim V S k (0) + c = p`= c in the limit.
whether the reserve price is r 0 or r 0 . Thus, requiring equilibrium to be undominated solves the problem. 33 Such an argument no longer works if d`< s < d h . In this case V S (1) v c, so no reserve price r 0 2 (c; v) is weakly dominated: The seller may believe that conditional on the winning bid being in [r 0 ; r 0 ], the state is very likely to be high so that it is optimal to reject it. Intuitively, non-competitive full-trade equilibria with r 0 > c for ! 1 are supported by o¤-equilibrium beliefs that put high probability on ! = h if the winning bid is below r 0 .
However, such o¤-equilibrium beliefs seem unnatural. First, recall that we already argued that in any full-trade equilibrium, for any r 0 and su¢ ciently large, the probability of ! = h is close to zero conditional on the winning bid being in [r 0 ; b 0 ], for any b 0 < v. 34 Thus, the equilibrium beliefs conditional on the winning bid have to be non-monotone in any noncompetitive full-trade equilibrium. Second, for bids that are on the equilibrium path, a later result shows that beliefs are monotone in all steady-state equilibria; see Lemma 3.
Equilibrium Re…nement and Competitive Limit
Given the above discussion, we formally introduce a re…nement that requires monotonicity of beliefs for o¤-equilibrium beliefs. We show that under this re…nement all sequences of (undominated) steady-state equilibria have competitive limits; that is, they aggregate information e¢ ciently. Recall that S 0 ( ; A) = Pr hjb (1) 2 A; is the posterior probability of h conditional on the highest bid being in a (measurable) set A. (ii) for all b 1 < b 2 it holds that if ( ) = b 2 , then
Condition ( Thus, the re…nement fails for b 1 = r 0 " and b 2 = r 0 , for " small enough and large enough:
Then, the left-hand side of (13) is roughly ds (r 0 c), while the right-hand side is roughly r 0 c.
The next result shows that this holds more generally. The re…nement of monotone beliefs rules out all steady-state equilibria that are not competitive in the limit. Non-competitive equilibria can only be supported by non-monotone beliefs.
Proposition 5 The allocation provided by any sequence of steady-state equilibria that satisfy the re…nement of monotone beliefs converges to the competitive limit.
The proposition is proven in the appendix. Given Proposition 4, we only need to show that, in the case d (`) < s < d (h), the trading price in the low state is competitive, meaning, p`= c. The key step of the proof (Step 1) is to show that, in the limit, when p`> c, any on-path winning bid su¢ ciently close to p`makes the sellers believe that the state is almost surely low. Then, part (i) of the re…nement extends this to bids below p`. Therefore, we can argue that it must be the case that sellers would accept a range of bids below p`, which upsets any equilibrium in which p`> c.
In the next two sections, we show that equilibrium beliefs are monotone, and we show that there do exist full-trade equilibria that satisfy the re…nement.
3 5 The expected price conditional on b (1) 2 [b1; b2] can be believed to be higher than b1 but not lower. Similarly, the continuation payo¤ conditional on b (1) 2 [b1; b2] may be believed to be lower than V S ( S 0 ( ; [b1; b2])) but not higher.
Monotone Equilibrium Updating
To motivate the re…nement of monotone beliefs, we show that
is increasing in b on the support of for every steady-state equilibrium for su¢ ciently large . This result implies that a higher winning bid in the support of equilibrium bids makes the high state more likely. 36 Thus, the re…nement restricts the set of equilibria only through its implications for bids that are outside the support of . Note that we need the characterization from Proposition 4 to argue that S(`) > S(h) and D(`) < D(h). In general, we cannot prove that this is true. In particular, we have not been able to verify that S 0 is monotone for all or for the cases in which d`< d h < s or s < d`< d h .
Equilibrium Existence
In the online Appendix, we prove that an equilibrium exists that satis…es the re…nement.
Proposition 6 There exists some < 1 such that for all > there exists an equilibrium that satis…es the re…nement of monotone beliefs and that has full-trade: For some r 0 and for all S and B in the support of beliefs in the stocks, For Proposition 6, we modify our previous construction of a full-trade equilibrium to make sure that for some o¤-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy the re…nement of monotone beliefs, the sellers do not have an incentive to decrease the reserve price below the equilibrium reserve price. To do so, we adopt o¤-equilibrium beliefs for the sellers that prescribe probability one to the lowest bidder type B if the bid is less than k ( B ). The key idea is to have type S (the highest belief in the support) set a reserve price at which he is just indi¤erent to trade conditional on the winning bid being equal to k ( B ). Sellers with beliefs below S strictly prefer accepting k ( B ), and the re…nement can be satis…ed by assigning reserve prices strictly below k ( B ). The resulting equilibria has "full trade"by monotonicity of k .
Discussion
Alternative Matching and Bargaining Protocols
The analysis in Section 6 implies that under full information about market conditions, any steady-state equilibrium has a competitive limit. Therefore, in Proposition 4, the possibility of non-competitive limits arises due to the combination of incomplete information about the economy and the particular matching and bargaining protocol. It is then natural to ask whether, maintaining the assumption of incomplete information about the economy, alternative protocols would yield competitive limits. We start the discussion by observing that, in the present model, the buyers compete directly by bidding, whereas there is no such competition between the sellers. This helps explain why the price is competitive when frictions are low in the case in which there are more buyers than sellers but the price may stay above the competitive level when there are more sellers than buyers. In particular, sellers do not compete away their pro…ts, because they face no direct competition. 38 In this section, we argue that when both buyers and sellers face direct competition, the price becomes competitive in both states. Moreover, the amount of direct competition does not have to be large in absolute value, only large compared to the level of frictions. First, consider a modi…cation where, with probability " > 0, each buyer is matched with two sellers (and with probability 1 " with one seller). Then the sellers compete, and it is our strong conjecture that the limit must be competitive even in the low state in this case. The reason is that each seller has an incentive to undercut its potential rival to make sure that the buyer chooses his o¤er. This is su¢ cient to force the reserve prices down to the cost of the sellers when there are more sellers than buyers in the economy. 39 Second, consider a setting where buyer competition is limited in that, for any given seller, at most two bids go through for the seller to choose from. We conjecture that this more limited buyer competition is su¢ cient for the price to be competitive in the high state, as buyers face a Bertrand-type head-on competition with probability one in the high state in the limit. 40 Therefore, a competitive limit arises as long as there is some but not necessarily overly …erce competition to trade with an agent on the short side.
Applications and Testable Implications
Online auction markets, especially eBay, are a natural application of our model. In particular, our model predicts that buyers increase their bids over time. Consequently, buyers may later regret not having won at a lower price earlier. Finally, buyers who have already spent more time on the market will win with higher probability. The empirical observations by Juda and
Parkes (2006), discussed in the introduction, are broadly consistent with these predictions.
It would be interesting to test systematically for the presence of learning on eBay.
More generally, the type of two-sided search model that we study has also been used in the literature to understand decentralized housing and labor markets; see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) . The housing market may …t well, since buyers and sellers are often small households (and, hence, have little experience with the market conditions) and some versions of an auction are indeed used in many countries.
Another application of our type of model is over-the-counter asset markets in which individual traders contact each other to bargain over terms or trade; see Du¢ e, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and Du¢ e (2012). 41 Indirect evidence for the presence of aggregate uncertainty is the impact of a reform that increased the post-trade transparency of the overthe-counter U.S. corporate bond market via posting of past transaction terms (TRACE); see, for example, Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) and the literature discussed therein. The fact that post-trade transparency a¤ected the market outcome is consistent with the presence of uncertainty about the market condition, at least by some traders; see Du¢ e, Dworczak, and Zhu (2016) and our discussion of policy implications below.
3 9 This discussion of direct competition is somewhat reminiscient of the role of competition for partners in Felli and Roberts (2016) . A similar "-competition model is also studied as a special case in Lauermann (2013) .
4 0 For example, the central arguments behind Proposition 4, namely, Lemmas 1 and 2, would extend immediately to this setting.
4 1 Search models for trade of an indivisible good-like ours-are useful for studying asset markets, but the assumed indivisibility is an important restriction that should be kept in mind. The advantage of an indivisible good model is its tractability.
Policy Implications
Despite its stylized nature, our model has some-at least, suggestive-policy implications.
Perhaps most signi…cant is that our model shows that decentralized markets can, in principle, achieve the market clearing outcome, even if no one individually knows what it is. Thus, aggregate uncertainty is not a reason per se to intervene in a market. This may be seen as lending support to Hayek's conjecture. At least in theory, this was not immediately evident from existing work on decentralized markets-especially given prior negative results in related settings. 42 Nevertheless, for large frictions, the outcome is not necessarily (constrained) e¢ cient or market clearing. In this case, "soft" interventions in the form of information provision (transparency) may already be useful. Future extensions of our model could further allow for heterogeneity in values and costs and for costly participation decisions. In these extensions, aggregate uncertainty would imply ine¢ cient trades and ine¢ cient entry choices, allowing the study of interventions that reduce uncertainty. The recent contribution by Du¢ e, Dworczak, and Zhu (2016) studies such interventions in a model of over-the-counter asset markets. In their work, one market side knows the market conditions. Extensions of our model would allow studying such interventions in settings with more symmetric uncertainty. 43 
Discussion of Assumptions
Initial Signals.-Newly arriving traders receive an initial signal. This initial signal serves only a technical purpose to avoid the notation related to mixed bidding strategies that would otherwise be necessary. All our results continue to hold if the initial signal is uninformative. 44 The fact that it is possible to have no external information in our setting may also clarify the relation to work on the foundation for rational expectations equilibrium with common values, as in Wolinsky (1990) and Golosov, Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2014) . Roughly speaking, in that literature, the question is whether information about the underlying value spreads from the initially "informed" to the "uninformed" traders through trade.
Minimal Feedback.-Information feedback in the trading protocol is minimal, so agents learn only through the failure to trade. Despite the minimal feedback, information aggregation is possible in equilibrium. In principle, it should be possible to extend the characterization results to trading protocols that reveal more information. For example, consider the 4 2 Indeed, we show more: even for positive frictions, as long as they are not too large, there exists a natural class of full-trade equilibria that achieves a constrained e¢ cient outcome, meaning that aggregate uncertainty and the war-of-attrition problem do not necessarily imply ine¢ ciencies beyond those imposed by the decentralized meeting technology.
4 3 Indeed, in the previous section, we mentioned an empirical work of Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) documenting the e¤ect of the introduction of post-trade transparency.
4 4 A supplement with details is available on request.
central arguments behind Proposition 4, namely, Lemmas 1 and 2. These lemmas use very basic arguments that do not rely on details of the protocol such as minimal feedback.
Extending the existence results, however, would be more challenging because (i) minimal feedback enabled us to construct the steady-state stock and the strategies separately ("decoupling") and (ii) more information implies more signaling possibilities, requiring more demanding re…nements for which equilibrium existence would be harder to establish.
We note that the full-trade equilibria remain equilibria if sellers observe the winning bid before making an acceptance decision (see Page 12). In addition, we establish in a companion paper that sellers have strict incentives to choose a protocol that limits information ‡ows to buyers because the value of continued search is smaller when buyers are uncertain about the state, reducing the value of their outside option; see Lauermann and Virág (2012) .
Steady-State and Learning with Overlapping Generations.-The overall stock of the market is in a steady state, and the underlying market conditions are assumed constant over time. This captures a setting in which traders believe market conditions to be stable relative to the duration of their own search. To us, this belief seems to be relevant in many search environments where there is entry by new traders over time, so that trade and learning continually take place. A model with entry in which di¤erent cohorts are continuously mixed to generate a steady distribution of beliefs may, therefore, be a realistic depiction. 45 Moreover, despite the stationarity on the aggregate level, the history-dependent, dynamic behavior of the individuals and cohorts is at the heart of our model and analysis. In particular, potential buyers and sellers learn about market conditions through experimentation over time and change their behavior as their beliefs change. Finally, although there is no market-wide learning, individual buyers and sellers will almost surely learn the state as frictions become small-and they will do so even if there are essentially no initial signals (meaning that this is true even if all information is endogenously generated by the market).
Simple Economy with Unit Demand/Supply.-The underlying economy is a simple market with unit demand and supply and homogeneous values and costs. There are two reasons for concentrating on such a simple economy. First, the assumption that the good is indivisible captures markets for goods like houses or labor, in which traders engage mostly in one-time transactions. The indivisibility is critical to how learning and experimentation take place. Learning is di¤erent if the good is easily divisible because traders can engage in frequent transactions of incremental units; see Golosov et al. (2014) . Thus, models with indivisible goods capture di¤erent economic scenarios from those with divisible goods.
There is also a technical reason for why we concentrate on the case of unit demand and supply. The advantage of our setup is that types are one-dimensional (beliefs about the state). This makes the analysis transparent, and also allows us to utilize available techniques for analyzing auctions and establish the existence of equilibrium. With divisible goods, the e¤ective type becomes two-dimensional-the beliefs and the current endowment of an agentand so one typically cannot establish equilibrium existence. It may be possible to push the characterization result further. For example, in a previous version (with a slightly di¤erent protocol and re…nement), we considered a setting with heterogeneous valuations-giving rise to a downward sloping market demand function-and showed market clearing in the limit.
However, our methods would not allow us to prove existence with two-dimensional types.
Conclusion
We study a search market in which the participants do not know the market conditions. We emphasize three contributions to the literature. First, we study the combined e¤ects of search and learning in a novel, two-sided equilibrium search model with uncertainty about market conditions. Second, we identify tractable "full-trade equilibria" that provide insights into the economics of decentralized markets and demonstrate how bidding and learning over time takes place. Third, we test the hypothesis that even if decentralized, markets can nevertheless aggregate information that is dispersed among their participants. When frictions are small, trade takes place at the correct market clearing prices "as if" the participants actually knew demand and supply conditions. We relate the behavior that leads to this outcome to a "decentralized tâtonnement process."
For small frictions, our analysis suggests that decentralized markets may work well even with uncertainty about the market conditions, despite earlier negative results in related settings. Natural applications of our model include labor markets and housing markets, but models of this kind have also proven useful for over-the-counter asset markets.
A number of open questions remain. In particular, to understand the relation to the negative results in Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001) for rational expectations equilibrium with common values, it may be useful to study a more general model that nests both of the extreme settings; that is, their pure common value environment and our private value setting. Furthermore, future work may use our algorithm for equilibrium construction to study the market outcome for large frictions: How large is equilibrium price dispersion?
How long do traders wait in the market? It would be interesting to quantify the impact of aggregate uncertainty: Can aggregate uncertainty magnify price/wage dispersion and waiting times (unemployment) relative to a market with known demand and supply conditions?
Appendix
Content. This Appendix contains the proofs for the general characterization results from the paper, namely, Propositions 4 and 5 and Lemma 3. All results concerning full-trade equilibria are relegated to a separate online Appendix.
Notation. We abuse notation and write Q B (( ; ) j!), Q S (( ; ) j!), P B (( ; ) j!) ; etc., for the trading probabilities and the (expected) transaction prices for the allocation of type who follows strategy or . Let Q B (bj!), Q S (rj!), P B (bj!) ; Q S (rj!) denote the trading probability and price variables for the constant bidding strategy b and constant reserve price strategy r, respectively.
We continue to use the convention that lim refers to a subsequence for which the limit exists, possibly in the extended reals.
Proof of Proposition 4
We start the proof of Proposition 4 with a number of intermediate results. The …rst Lemma captures the implications of experimentation becoming cheap as frictions vanish.
Lemma 4 Consider any sequence of steady-state equilibria for k ! 1.
Sellers. If for some > 0 it holds that lim Q S k ( jh) = 1, then the realized transaction price of a seller with belief converges in distribution to a single price
. Buyers. If for some < 1 it holds that lim Q B k ( j`) = 1, then the realized transaction price of a buyer with belief converges in distribution to a single price p`( ) 2 [c; v] in the low
Proof. We prove the lemma for the sellers'side only. Fix ;
Step 1. We show that the actual trading price of type converges to p h ( ) in probability in the high state.
Given lim Q S k ( jh) = 1, it follows that there exists a sequence t k with lim t k k = 1 such that the seller trades almost surely by period t k in the high state in the limit if he employs his equilibrium strategy. Let k (p) denote the probability of selling at price p or above by period t k if the equilibrium strategy is used by type . Suppose that for some p > p h ( ), lim k (p) > 0, otherwise convergence to p h ( ) in probability follows. 46 We propose a strategy (p) with two properties: P1. the seller trades at or above price p with a probability converging to 1 in the state h, P2. the payo¤ achieved in the low state converges to the (full information) optimal payo¤ in the state`, lim V S k (0): The strategy (p) has the following form: the seller sets a reserve price p for z k periods, where z k = k t k . After z k periods, if the seller has not traded he adopts a strategy that is optimal in the low state. We require that lim k = 1, and that lim z k k = 1. 47 This strategy satis…es properties P1 and P2. To see that P1 is satis…ed by (p), we show that the probability of trading by period z k (at or above price p) in the high state converges to one.
Let q k denote the probability of trading in the high state by period t k if (p) is used. It holds that q k k (p), 48 and thus lim k (p) > 0 implies q = lim q k > 0. Using, that lim z k k = 1; the trading probability o¤ered by strategy (p) by period z k = k t k in the high state in the limit is lim q + (1 q)q + ::::(1 q)
To see that P2 is satis…ed, note that the exogenous exit probability by period z k converges to zero as lim z k k = 1. Therefore, the seller drops out with a zero probability in the limit before he switches to a strategy that is optimal in the low state (at period z k ), and thus his payo¤ in the low state converges to the full information limiting payo¤ lim V S k (0). 49 It is immediate from P1 and P2 that the original strategy was not optimal, a contradiction with our starting assumption.
Step 2:
Step 1 implies that a price p h ( 0 ) is achieved almost surely by type 0 in the equilibrium in the high state if
strategy (p h ( ) ") for " arbitrarily small, which would improve his payo¤ in state h to p h ( ), and attain the optimal payo¤ in state`. 50 Therefore, p h ( 0 ) = p h ( ) must hold in equilibrium.
Finally, the full information payo¤ can be achieved by such a strategy (p h ( ) ") in the 4 6 Because then the seller trades almost surely at the expected price p h in the limit as the mean trading price is p h . 4 7 Formally, lim
, which then provides the appropriate construction.
4 8 This holds because if an arbitrary reserve price strategy trades at a price p or above in a period, then strategy (p) trades at a price p or above in that same period or before.
4 9 This argument assumes that the trading probability by period z k stays zero in the low state in the limit. But otherwise, a sure trading probability (over the entire lifetime) at price p or above could be guaranteed in the low state. But then in both states a revenue of p or above could be guaranteed and thus setting a reserve below p and achieving a revenue of p h cannot be optimal in the high state. 5 0 Again, the argument assumes that the trading probability by period z k stays zero in the low state in the limit. This assumtpion is without loss of generality, see the footnote above for further discussion. low state in the limit (as outlined in Step 1) regardless of the value of p h ( ) and " > 0, which concludes the proof.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose lim Q S k (1jh) < 1. We want to show that
, and hence k k (1) for all all k. Hence, lim k (1) = lim k (1). It follows from the monotonicity of k that lim P S k (1jh) = lim k (1). From the de…nition of V S k and (8), for all k large enough,
From the displayed equation, the hypothesis lim Q S k (1jh) < 1, and the previous observation lim P S k (1jh) = lim k (1), it follows that lim k (1) = c. Since we already showed lim k (1) = lim k (1), the hypothesis lim Q S k (1jh) < 1 implies that lim k (1) = lim k (1) = c. Q:E:D:
which proves the lemma. 
Let p`:= lim P S k (0j`). From (8) and (16),
for any " > 0, by optimality of setting reserve price k (0) (if k (0) ! v such " does not exist but then the lemma follows directly from k (0)
where the …rst equality follows from de…nition of q S k and the second follows from (17). So, lim e k < 1 and lim e
where the …rst equality is from the de…nition of q B k , the …rst inequality from S
and the second inequality from the previous …ndings. Recall
Thus, if lim k (0) < v we can choose " small enough such that the ratio of the pro…ts at
Hence, assuming lim k (0) < v implies a contradiction to the optimality of b k = k (0).
Q:E:D:
We say that the law-of-one-price holds if the distribution of the realized transaction price converges in distribution to a point for almost all types in the in ‡ow. 
Proof. Consider ! = h.
Suppose lim k (1) > c. Then, the monotonicity of k and Lemma 1 imply that lim Q S k ( jh) = 1 for all 2 h S ; S i , as claimed. Suppose lim k (1) = c. We show that this implies a contradiction. As in the proof of Lemma 1, k (1) k (1), and so lim k (1) = c. But if lim k (1) = lim k (1) = c, then the monotonicity of k and k implies that given any ", a bid c + " wins for sure when k is large enough. Thus, lim V B k ( ) = v c for all . This requires lim Q B k ( jh) = 1 for almost all 2 h B ;
B i -in contradiction to mass balance given d h > s: Namely, feasibility requires that
Finally, mass balance requires that Consider ! =`. 
To see why, suppose otherwise and suppose that a positive fraction of the entering cohort has belief
such that lim Q B k ( B j`) < 1. Then there exists a sequence t k with lim t k k < 1 such that in a steady state equilibrium there is a positive mass of buyers still on the market who entered at least t k periods ago. Noting that lim implies that lim Q S k (1jh) = 1. So, Lemma 4 requires P S k (1jh) = P S k ( jh) for all and from Lemma 5, P S k (1jh) = p h . Thus, by Lemma 4, the probability that some buyer bids higher than p h + " must vanish for every ". In addition, lim k (1) = p h from (8), P S k (1jh) ! p h and lim Q S k (1jh) = 1. Hence, a bid p h + " wins with probability converging to one for every
Proof of Proposition 4 for the case where
. Mass balance and s < dp Lemma 6 Take any sequence of equilibria that satis…es the re…nement of monotone beliefs, and suppose that lim
Proof. Suppose Lemma 6 does not hold, and take b such that b > lim V S k (0) + c, and
, and we show that the condition for the re…nement of monotone beliefs is violated for high enough k. By point i) of the re…nement for every " > 0, lim
Proof of Proposition 5.
We need to show that p`= c, where p`is as de…ned in Proposition 4 for the case where
Case 1: p`= lim V S k (0) + c. By Proposition 4, and monotonicity of the bid functions and updating lim Q B k (xj`) = 1 for all x B . Therefore, Lemma 4 implies that for ! =`, almost all buyers trade in the limit at the price p`. Hence, so do the sellers, meaning, lim P S k (zj`) = p`for almost all z 2 (0; 1). By Proposition 4, lim Q S k (zjh) = 1, and thus Lemma 4 implies lim(W S k (zj`) = lim V S k (0) for all z 2 (0; 1). So, the hypothesis implies lim(W S k (zj`) = p` c for almost all z. Since lim P S k (zj`) = p`, this implies that either p`= c or lim Q S k (zj`) = 1 for almost all z 2 (0; 1)-but lim Q S k (zj`) = 1 for almost all z 2 (0; 1) cannot hold by feasibility if s > d`. Hence, p`= c, which implies the claim.
Take any z 2 B ; B . From Proposition 4, the monotonicity of k , and Lemma 8 (monotone updating), lim Q B k (zj`) = 1 and lim Q B k (zjh) < 1. Take 2 (0; 1) and let t k be the smallest number such that type z wins with a probability of at least by period t k in state`. With k being the posterior after t k 1 periods, type z wins with a probability of at least at a bid of at most b k = k ( k ) (by monotonicity of + ). 51 Such t k exists for k large enough. From Proposition 4, lim b k = p`. Also, ( k ) t k ! 1. Therefore, the probability that z wins with a bid b k or lower in state h is vanishing to zero. Since z wins with a probability 5 1 For example, with t k = 2,
not more than before t k in state`and with probability converging to zero in state h, we have k < 1. This follows from lim
Step 1: For all x k S and b k = k ( k ) (as de…ned above),
Note that the distribution of beliefs must satisfy
This follows from the Bayesian consistency of the distribution of posterior beliefs. 52 Also, by construction S k (`) s 1 k and S k (h) s hold. Therefore, upon substitution, we obtain
(1 B k ( k j`))
:
By assumption, x k S < 1, and we already argued lim k < 1. Also, lim D k (`)=S k (`) = 0
by Lemma 2, and thus lim e D k (`) S k (`)
(1 B k ( k j`)) = 1. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to prove that
From ( k ) t k ! 1 and lim Q B k ( jh) < 1 for all , we have lim(1 B k ( k jh)) = 0.
Finally, by Lemma 5 it holds that lim
, and so (21) holds.
Step 2. ] that is not in the limit of the supports of the bid distributions but b is. Then for it to be optimal to bid close to b in the limit, it must hold that b is in the limit of the supports of the reserve price distributions.
But then Lemma 6 implies that b lim V S k (0) + c, a contradiction. Second, suppose that for some r 2 [lim V S k (0) + c + "; b k ] it holds that r is in the limiting support of the reserve price distribution. Then again Lemma 6 yields a contradiction.
Step 3. Given any " small enough and k large enough, bidding b 0 k = V S k (0) + c + " is strictly more pro…table for k than bidding b k .
By the hypothesis of the case, lim b 0 k < lim b k = p`. In addition, the probability that there is no other buyer converges to one when ! =`. Hence, given Step 2, conditional on ! =`, bidding b 0 k strictly increases payo¤s for k since b 0 k wins with the same probability as b k in the low state in the limit: lim k ; b k ], the state is almost sure to be low in the limit. But in the low state, it is more pro…table to place bid b 0 k as we argued above, and Step 3 is complete. Thus, we have reached a contradiction and so Case 2 cannot occur.
Since the claim holds in Case 1, this completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Monotone Updating and Proof of Lemma 3
We prove monotonicity of certain posteriors for the case where d h > s > d`. We start the analysis with the following result:
Lemma 7 If is large enough, then 
and thus 
Suppose that for all 2 supp B it holds that is increasing in because 
( jh)
(1 ) B
(1)
is also increasing in .
Therefore, we only to need to establish that 2 supp B implies in a steady-state. 53 By feasibility t(`) d`, and by the fact that the limit is competitive in the high state we have that lim S k (h)(1 k ) = s lim t k (h) = 0. Therefore, we obtain that lim S k (`)=S k (h) = 1 and thus
is increasing for all B .
Next, we establish Lemma 8. Recall that B + ( ; b) is the posterior of a buyer who starts with belief , and learns that the bid b did not win (either there was a higher bidder or the seller had set a higher reserve price). Proof. Let F ! b (x) = B (1) ( 1 (x)j!) denote the probability that the highest bid is less than or equal to x in state !. Similarly, let F ! r (x) = S ( 1 (x)j!) denote the probability that the reserve price set is less than or equal to x in state !. Given previous results, it holds that
(1 B ( 1 (x)j!)) . In the main text we show that F ! b (x) = B
1 (x)j! and 1. We show that
is weakly increasing in b and we know that by construction is increasing in for all S . The analogue of (22) for the sellers implies that
. Therefore,
is strictly increasing in , which implies that
is increasing in as well. 54 Q:E:D:
Another consequence of Lemma 7 is that updating is monotone for the sellers as well.
Formally, let S + ( ; r) be the posterior of a seller who starts with belief , and learns that the highest bid is less than r (including the event that there is no bidder present at all). 
In the proof of Lemma 8, we showed that and thus the fact that
is increasing in implies that
Finally, we prove Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. which holds for a large enough as we argued in the proof of Lemma 7. Q:E:D:
